Given the dire current events in Afghanistan, decided to post my feedback circa 2017 on US's ongoing debacle in Afghanistan.
Here is the original link to "expert" feedback:
https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/R4-Q10-Approach-to-Afghanistan_final.pdf
Comments on the US Approach to Afghanistan by Shireen Khan Burki, Ph.D.
First, with all due respect to the powers that be, what exactly is the strategic mission of the United States vis-a-vis Afghanistan? Judging from the current quagmire, there has never been a coherent policy based on a long term view or perspective. This is not an anomaly either as, I believe, our policy(ies) since the 1980s in Afghanistan (during the Soviet occupation) and Pakistan (under General Zia ul Haq et al) were poorly thought out, and rather short-sighted, which backfired on us.
Now to address this two pronged question, let’s start with the “benefits” of our fifteen year “presence” in Afghanistan for the United States. There are none. Not for the people of the United States. The beneficiaries of American largesse have primarily been a certain segment of the Afghan populace (the elite and the warlords/drug mafia), and the Pakistani State (in the provision of massive U.S. “aid” to a “critical” ally in the so-called “War on Terror”). For the majority of Afghan people, the removal of a brutal and misogynistic regime (led by Mullah Mohammad Omar Hotaki) was a welcomed event. The influx of US monies has trickled down to the masses. Quality of life has improved in stark comparison to the Taliban years.
However, circa 2017, there’s an almost déjà vu sense of foreboding amongst Afghans across ethnic lines (Afghanistan’s turbulent history seems cyclical which inevitably lends itself to hedging bets for the sake of survival) as they witness a NATO drawdown. The original U.S. mission had a clear goal: to kill or capture the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack. Fair enough. Osama bin Laden is dead. Mullah Omar is too. Both, I might add, died in the bosom of Pakistan. Ayman al Zawahiri is likely comfortably ensconced and cared for there as well, though probably no longer in one of their cantonments. Although, given the chutzpah of the Pakistanis (especially the military), one shouldn’t be surprised if he’s still lurking fairly close to a military cantonment.
Which begs the question: Who and where is the enemy? Given the original mission circa 2001 (to kill or capture the mastermind/perpetrators of 9/11), we never gave Mullah Omar –who played no role in Al Qaeda’s operation—a behind-the-scenes, face-saving way to hand over his Arab “guest(s).” Publicly cornered, Mullah Omar’s nang/honor demanded he stand his ground and fulfill his obligation of nanawati (asylum) for OBL as much as he despised/distrusted OBL and his ilk. Had we handled this differently from the outset, the outcome would’ve been far more palatable than the one we face today.
Once the Taliban regime was overthrown, the United States should’ve declared fait accompli and departed from the region in 2004 once elections were held, and our perceived (by the Afghans, and eerily reminiscent of Imperial Britain’s reviled Shah Shuja) puppet, Hamid Karzai, was installed. We failed to listen to Afghans from across the political and social spectrum at the Bonn Conference, when they clamored in one voice (a historic first) for the reinstatement of Muhammad Zahir Shah as Amir or King in a Constitutional Monarchy. A move which would’ve done so much on so many levels for a people recovering from decades of war and violence.
It would have tamed the centrifugal forces, and been a nightmare for their nemesis across the Durand Line, which has worked hard to undermine Afghanistan’s sovereignty with a deceptive “Strategic Depth” argument that rings hollow. Yes, I’m talking about Pakistan. And this trajectory began in the 1980s. Current security conditions in Afghanistan continue to deteriorate. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is far from a cohesive force. There is resentment that the officer corps is dominated by non-Pashtuns. The Pashtuns have always prided themselves on being the “top dog” and don’t take kindly to playing second fiddle. Reliance on non-Pashtuns as foot soldiers, especially in the Kandaks deployed to Pashtun majority regions in the east and south has led to widespread resentment and distrust.
Worse, it has contributed to the opposition “Taliban” recruitment efforts for the “insurgency.” The “Taliban” (a catch all phrase which includes warlords, drug mafia, adventurers, mercenaries etc.) have regained lost ground as the Afghan central “government” controls just over 50% of its so-called sovereign territory. That statistic alone should give room for pause vis-à-vis any critical cost-benefit analysis of a continued conventional U.S. military presence.
Which addresses the second question, basically, moving forward what should U.S. policy look like? First, strategically speaking, we have to accept that due to what has, in our foreign policy approaches, become an unfortunate norm of “mission creep” (with disastrous consequences), we’ve lost any face-saving way to exit Afghanistan gracefully. If it’s any consolation, we weren’t the first. The British Empire during its zenith was humiliated in two back to back Anglo Afghan Wars of 1839-1842 and 1878-1880 due to hubris and an overconfidence camouflaging incompetence. Not to mention the Soviet Union’s debacle based on a misreading (premature?) of unfolding events in Afghanistan and their own “domino theory” vis-à-vis an “Islamist” threat to their interests in neighboring satellite states. A familiar pattern.
Superpowers seem to gravitate towards conquering Afghanistan starting with Alexander the Great and exhibit a degree of optimism in their ability to accomplish the mission that fails to consider a myriad of factors starting with the two most basic elements: the terrain and a xenophobic warrior populace. The business of “nation building” is herculean in the best of circumstances. Afghanistan is essentially a fourth world state. Fourth. World. But with an overconfidence bordering on insanity, we --the United States-- thought in a few short years we could build a robust democratic Republic in a failed state run like it belonged in medieval times under the Taliban; with little or any infrastructure to speak of, let alone a cohesive populace.
While one can admire such optimism it has, in my opinion, come at too high a cost, especially when we consider lives and limbs lost to what end? The argument that if we pull out as the Soviets did, Afghanistan will become a safe haven for those who plot the next 9/11 rings hollow as the metastasized global threat from Muslim terrorists (muharribun) has plenty of sanctuaries for those who plot the next strike. Known and unknown. Some right under our own very noses in the West i.e., on our own home turf. The Afghans have a right to be peeved at the US’s interventionist approach/response in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 given the facts.
The problem has never been Afghanistan. The problem has been, and is, our “staunchest” ally Pakistan (and its benefactors). The country where Al Qaeda originated; where the Pakistani mastermind (Khalid Sheikh Muhammad) planned 9/11; where Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri sought, and found, sanctuary after 9/11; and where the current Al Qaeda Emir –Zawahiri— continues to find safe harbor.
Bottom line: For certain Afghans our presence has been a Godsend. We are a cash cow which bolsters an expanding endemic culture of corruption within limited circles at the expense of the larger populace. We need to take a cold hard look at how our continued "nation building" and military presence is beneficial to American interests (short and long term). Afghans will need to fix their own country. And we need to hold Pakistan accountable for providing a safe haven for Al Qaeda and its ideologues; and for being the global ideological nexus of contemporary Islamic terrorism.
